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IDENTIFYING HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING
IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
Advances in telecommunications technology increasingly allow firms
and individuals located far apart to behave as though they were geo-
graphic neighbors. The resulting economic benefits have been widely
discussed.' Today, firms increasingly communicate and transact business
with their customers through networks of computers rather than in
person or by telephone. Electronic commerce is likely to reduce some
of the delay and other transaction costs now associated with the distribu-
tion of products and services. Yet, new ways of conducting business can
also bring new ways for competing firms to reduce rivalry by fixing prices.
Wholesale and retail distribution of goods and services is evolving.
Marketing and direct sales on the Internet may be the wave of the
commercial future. In a world of electronic real-time marketing sellers
hold themselves out to the entire globe, one PC at a time. Buyers can
quickly and cheaply reach many sellers without leaving their homes or
offices, and they may observe, download, and compare publicly posted
prices. Indeed, buyers and sellers may interact with "intelligent agents,"
personalized software sidekicks searching the electronic marketplace for
optimal choices and likely customers.
What could be more procompetitive than instant, universal exchange
and evaluation of enormous amounts of market and product informa-
tion? The electronic marketplace can dramatically reduce a buyer's trans-
action costs of search, and it can help firms make better production and
* Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed are
not necessarily those of the Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner. This article
revises and extends the author's speech, Horizontal Price-Fixing in Cyberspace, Before
The Conference Board's 1996 Antitrust Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy
(Mar. 7, 1996). Although the author participated in the Antitrust Division's investigation
of the Airline Tariff Publishing Co. matter, his views are not necessarily those of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The author is grateful to Michael Wise, Mary Jean Moltenbrey, and
Alan Frankel.
I E.g., Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Benefits of the Administration's Legislative
Proposals on Telecommunications (June 14, 1994).
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pricing decisions. 2 In addition, Internet access and advertising could
reduce the sunk costs of entry, also making markets more competitive.
In short, rapid information exchange can help buyers obtain better and
cheaper products. Microsoft's Bill Gates makes some of these arguments
in the chapter of his new book tellingly titled "Frictionless Competition. "
But information posted on the Internet goes to rivals as well as customers,
and rapid information exchange among sellers may help sellers exercise
market power.4
Part I of this article examines how the rapid information exchange
characteristic of the electronic marketplace may facilitate what might be
termed "frictionless coordination" among sellers, rather than generating
frictionless competition. In particular, when competitive rivals have rapid
access to information about each other's pricing and the ability to re-
spond rapidly, they may improve their ability to reach and police anticom-
petitive coordination, thereby making coordination more likely or more
effective. Part I also explains why such potential coordination among
oligopolists properly concerns antitrust enforcers and courts.
Part II explores how electronic commerce presents a new opportunity
for analytical paralysis over the continually perplexing "oligopoly prob-
lem "-the concern that the law cannot or should not prevent firms from
using otherwise legal means to achieve anticompetitive marketplace out-
comes.
Before the advent of computers, the best examples of the way rapid
public information exchange challenged antitrust enforcers and courts
involved price signaling by press release. For example, suppose that a
leading newspaper reported that one firm told security analysts that
prices will soon go up 4 percent. The next week, a rival told the trade
press that its prices will rise 3 percent except for the high performance
line, which will go up 5 percent. In reporting that story, one reporter
queried a third firm, which stated that the 3 percent/5 percent split is
consistent with its plans. The following week, the first firm issued new
price books incorporating the differential 3 percent/5 percent price
2 Robert Gertner, Testimony at FTC Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competi-
tion, Nov. 20, 1995. Moreover, under some circumstances sellers could use rapid and
inexpensive communications technology to make secret discounts to selected buyers. This
could discourage coordinated interaction, albeit by limiting or reversing the reduction in
buyer search costs that communications advances promise.
BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 157 (1995).
Gertner, supra note 2, at Tr. 2771 (corrected version). Gertner emphasizes the "trade-
off between the beneficial effects of sharing information about market costs and demands,
which can lead firms to make more efficient production and pricing decisions, and the
harmful effects of sharing information about prices, quantities, and customers, which can
enable firms to charge a price above competitive levels." Id.
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rise, and the other firms followed suit in the next few days. The tough
question for antitrust is whether these firms agreed to fix their prices.5
In the press release scenario, price announcements were available to
rivals and customers alike; they were communicated rapidly and revised
cheaply and easily. These features are also likely to characterize informa-
tion exchange in the electronic marketplace. With electronic commerce,
firms may learn the plans and actions of their rivals merely by looking
at what their competitors have posted on-line. Firms can and would
monitor routinely the competitive moves of their rivals, regardless of
whether they were coordinating or competing. 6 If such monitoring is
common, and prices rise afterjockeying, again antitrust must ask whether
the firms had agreed on price.
In evaluating oligopoly behavior under the conditions of rapid, exten-
sive information exchange characteristic of electronic commerce, anti-
trust enforcers and courts must determine whether competition has been
harmed and, if so, whether enforcers can prove it and courts can frame
a remedy. These legal issues are often discussed in terms of identifying
when it would be appropriate to infer an agreement over price from
circumstantial evidence (e.g. parallel pricing). 7 Part II of this article
explains that firms have reached what the law terms a horizontal agree-
ment over price only if an oligopoly achieves a high price equilibrium
through what may be termed the "forbidden process" of negotiation and
exchange of assurances, rather than through leader-follower behavior.
This section also highlights three economic indicators that could show
that firms are selecting a high price by doing more than merely following
the market moves of rivals.
The concern that rivals can exploit electronic information exchange
to make coordination more effective has already proven itself more than
theoretical. As will be examined in Part III of this article, the Department
of Justice recently obtained consent orders from the major airlines set-
ling allegations that the carriers negotiated a number of coordinated
I This type of hypothetical problem is analyzed in Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act
Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory,
38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 165-68, 186-190 (1993).
1 Sellers of branded consumer products are already eager consumers of supermarket
scanner data, which provides them with detailed information about the prices and sales
shares of rivals. With the spread of electronic commerce, firms may employ software to
compile and analyze similar data obtained from Internet postings and electronic transac-
tions.
7 This article's discussion of when or whether a court should find an agreement puts
aside the important legal issue of how an agreement should be reviewed once found:
whether it is illegal per se; if reviewed under the rule of reason, whether that review
should be truncated or full-blown; and how the "less restrictive alternative" issue should
be analyzed.
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fare increases using a signaling language developed from features of
electronic fare records largely unavailable or valueless to ticket buyers.
The airlines case illustrates how the three indicators may help identify
a price-fixing agreement reached in the electronic marketplace. Part IV
applies the lessons learned from the airlines case to the problem of
identifying horizontal price fixing as commerce expands to the elec-
tronic marketplace.
I. "FRICTIONLESS COORDINATION" THROUGH RAPID
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AMONG RIVALS
In the familiar economic model of perfect competition, information
is an unqualified good. This observation suggests that more information,
available faster and at lower cost, can make markets more transparent,
enhance buyer choices, help firms make better and cheaper products,
and improve competition. But while that may often be the case, achieving
competitive results may depend on who is getting such high-quality
information and what they can do with it. Indeed, the theory of coordi-
nated oligopoly behavior shows how increased information can actually
reduce welfare. Greater information exchange among sellers, as may
result from the shift to electronic commerce, can facilitate coordination
and lead to supracompetitive prices in two ways.
First, the rapid and inexpensive exchange of information among sellers
may make it easier for sellers that want to coordinate to find a set of
prices and outputs on which they can implicitly (or explicitly) agree.
When it is difficult to identify a consensus high price outcome without
making explicit interfirm commitments, 8 rivals may be deterred from
coordinating by the practical difficulty of keeping a coordinated agree-
ment going and by the risk of criminal sanctions for engaging in overtly
conspiratorial behavior. Under such circumstances rapid information
exchange can reduce coordination difficulties by permitting firms to
engage in complex discussions more easily and by making those conversa-
tions less obvious to customers and antitrust enforcers. Such communica-
tion can facilitate coordination even if it is what economists term "cheap
talk"-that is, communication imposing little or no costs of commitment
on the parties.9 This outcome is most likely when the primary impediment
8 In some cases leader-follower dynamics alone may enable parties to identify and settle
on a scheme or set of prices that dampens competition without the kinds of surreptitious
communication usually associated with criminal conspiracies.
9 SeeJoseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996,
at 103.
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to successful coordination is identifying the terms of coordination, rather
than policing such an arrangement once it is reached.'0
Second, improved information exchange may also facilitate coordina-
tion by reducing any single firm's incentive to deviate from a coordinated,
supracompetitive price once that is identified. Any firm's incentive to
cut prices comes from the expectation of increased sales. But if rivals
can detect and will match price reductions very quickly, as may occur
when prices are posted in the electronic marketplace, this incentive can
be greatly weakened. Few buyers will switch from rival sellers, and the
price-cutting seller will gain only a fraction of any increase in aggregate
buyer purchases. The result of more rapid information exchange among
sellers thus may be that sellers will not cut prices in the first place, and any
higher-than-competitive price, however initially reached, would persist.
The instant electronic marketplace will not necessarily attract new
entry to solve this competitive problem. If an entrant's products are
similar to those offered by the existing sellers, the new seller will need
to undercut the coordinated price to be successful. But the potential
for incumbent sellers to match the low price nearly instantaneously
means the entrant must worry that it will make few sales and not recover
the costs of entry. The new entrant into electronic commerce must also
establish a reputation, not just for its products but also for its probity.
In the anonymous expanses of electronic commerce, conventional deter-
rents against deception, low quality, and outright fraud are still weak.
To convince wary buyers that they are legitimate, new entrants may need
to make substantial fixed investments in reputation." Yet, if entry turns
out to require substantial investment, entry may not be sufficient to
undermine supracompetitive pricing. 2
The problem of anticompetitive coordination among oligopolists is
more than a theoretical curiosity. There are four reasons to think it is
10 Firms that must identify the terms of coordination across several different product or
geographic markets may find "cheap talk" a useful way to coordinate their strategies.
Multimarket contact may also facilitate the disciplining of firms that would be tempted
to cheat on the coordinated arrangement. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael Whinston,
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1990); William N. Evans &
loannis N. Kessides, Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry,
109 Q.J. EcON. 341 (1994).
"To be sure, certifying agencies may develop to assure buyers that sellers will actually
send goods promised and deal with problems that arise. See Gertner, supra note 2. Another
marketplace response to the quality assurance problem would be for a firm to post a bond
backed by a well-known institution. Still another tactic would be to promote, buy, or
extend "brand name" recognition. However, such marketplace responses would often
be expensive.
12SeeJOHN SuTrON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE (1991).
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a serious possibility that properly concerns antitrust enforcers and courts.
First, the active criminal enforcement program of the Antitrust Division
demonstrates that firms do indeed fix prices. Second, contemporary
economic theory's study of "repeated games" shows that supracompeti-
tive pricing through coordination is plausible in many oligopolies even
if the firms do not reach that outcome by engaging in the process
antitrust law deems an agreement.13 Third, recent empirical research
suggests that there is a great deal of market power in some concentrated
industries, and that anticompetitive conduct is a significant cause of high
price-cost margins. 14
Finally, academic business strategists teach firms actively to facilitate
coordination. One common pedagogical device is a business school
case1 5 based on the pricing strategies followed by General Electric and
Westinghouse in the wake of their criminal price-fixing convictions in
the government's famous Electrical Equipment cases of thirty-five years
ago. 6 No longer were bids assigned by the phases of the moon and a
series of secret meetings. The firms, instead, introduced a number of
practices unilaterally to improve their prospects of reaching consensus by
simplifying their strategies and to discourage deviation. By standardizing
product definitions, distributing price books, and committing to "most
favored customer" protections, they succeeded in lifting prices back up
toward where they had been when the firms were conspiring overtly.17
When they study this example, business students are taught explicitly
how to raise prices to levels that they would achieve if they were conspiring
with their competitors, 18 but in a way that makes it difficult for courts
to infer an agreement so they will not land in jail.
II. AGREEMENT AND THE "OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM"
Antitrust's long engagement with the "oligopoly problem"-the con-
cern that prices will exceed competitive levels when sellers have few
3 See Baker, supra note 5, at 154-56 (discussing antitrust implications of the "folk theo-
rem" for infinitely repeated games with observable actions).
4 Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011, 1052-53 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989) (conclusions A and B).
1 5
MICHAEL PORTER, CASES IN COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 102-18 (1983).
"'United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,487 (D.
Pa. 1962).
17 See Proposed Modification of Existing Judgments, United States v. General Elec., 42
Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977). On the ways most-favored-customer protection can facilitate
coordination, see Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competi-
tive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517 (1996).
" Cf MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 93-95 (1980) (encouraging unilateral
signaling announcements, selective advertising to discipline recalcitrant rivals, and price
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rivals-has generated a rich vein of cases and commentary available for
mining for insight into the problem of identifying horizontal price fixing
in the electronic marketplace. 19 Though no summary can do justice to
this literature, several threads are particularly relevant to addressing the
problem posed by rapid information exchange through electronic com-
merce.
The common judicial definitions of agreement-a "meeting of the
minds" or "conscious commitment to a common scheme"-are not the
most useful tools to identify agreements from circumstantial evidence
in parallel pricing cases. 20 The reason: a court conscientiously applying
these definitions would be led to mistakenly infer an agreement merely
from the consciously parallel interaction among oligopolists. When one
firm in an oligopoly raises its price, and each of the others follows that
lead, the definitions are satisfied: the first price increase is an offer; those
that follow are acceptances; as each observes the other's actions, they
reach a common understanding. Accepting this result by inferring agree-
ment whenever oligopolists price in parallel is a mistake: it would lead
the law into a hopeless swamp by leaving the courts without a remedy.21
Assuming that parallel behavior alone were considered illegal, there
would be nothing practical that a court could order the parties to do to
correct it. If agreement is evidenced by something beyond merely parallel
price behavior, then a court can, in principle, enjoin that extra "some-
thing." But if that extra "something" is absent, the only remedy isjudicial
price regulation-a complete non-starter. That is why, to paraphrase the
leadership), 106 (advocating standardization to simplify industry decision variables and
facilitate identifying a focal point).
19The oligopoly problem has generated several landmark Supreme Court decisions. E.g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). The most influential precedents from the last two decades
have come from the circuit courts. E.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.1043 (1980); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851
F.2d 478,484 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer,J.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); In reCoordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991). Moreover, antitrust's leading commentators have written
important articles on the subject. E.g., Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962);
Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv.
1562, 1576 (1969). For recent commentary, see generally Symposium on Tacit Collusion, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1993).
20 See Posner, supra note 19, at 1576; see also Baker, supra note 5, at 178; cf. Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1984) (to show "a meeting of the
minds" or "a common scheme" in a dealer-termination case "evidence must be presented
both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was
sought by the manufacturer.").
21See Turner, supra note 19.
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Supreme Court, conscious parallelism has not read "agreement" out of
the Sherman Act.22
The need to frame a satisfactory remedy generates other limits on the
application of the antitrust laws. A firm or oligopoly that happens to
charge prices above the competitive level does not for that reason alone
violate Sherman Act Section 1. Moreover, mere leader-follower behavior
is not illegal even if supracompetitive prices result.
2 3
An agreement under antitrust law is better defined by what the courts
actually do in parallel pricing cases than by the words of the common
definitions. Rather than deeming mere conscious parallelism an agree-
ment, courts look for certain additional features of firm behavior called
"plus factors" to support an inference of agreement. 24 The principal plus
factors have historically been the kinds of things that suggest that there
really was a secret agreement, such as secret direct communications just
before prices rise. 25 Plus factors are evidence that the parties have gone
through a process of negotiation and exchange of assurances in addition
to, or as the reason for, their parallel price behavior. They support a
conclusion based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence that the
parties have done more than merely watch each other's market behavior
and respond to it independently, as leaders and followers.
This judicial methodology carries with it an important point: the legal
idea of "agreement" does not describe a result or equilibrium, but one
particular process of reaching supracompetitive marketplace out-
comes-what may be termed the "forbidden process" of negotiation and
exchange of assurances. 26 The forbidden process consists of behavior that
can be enjoined. Thus, if the oligopoly reaches a high price equilibrium
through the forbidden process that the law calls an agreement, Sherman
Act Section 1 has been violated. If the same result were reached through
leader-follower behavior, no agreement on price will be found.
As a predicate to clear thinking and wise enforcement of price fixing
in the electronic marketplace, it is especially important for courts to
focus on whether firms have engaged in the forbidden process and,
concomitantly, on whether a remedy can successfully be framed. Under
conditions of rapid information exchange, the antitrust laws seek to
22Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
23 See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988)
(BreyerJ.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989).
246 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1434a (1986); see William E. Kovacic, The
Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL.
5, 31-55 (1993).
25 Baker, supra note 5, at 175-77.
26 See id. at 179.
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determine whether the close scrutiny firms give each other and the quick
responses that firms make to competitive moves by their rivals have
evolved into conversations that can be recognized as negotiations and
the exchange of assurances. In policing electronic commerce, as with
price signaling by press release, the question will be less often whether
the firms met in secret and more often whether their interactions consti-
tuted the forbidden process of agreement.27
The critical task of determining whether firms pricing in parallel have
engaged in the forbidden process is in large part an economic question
because the Supreme Court, in Matsushita, refused to permit an inference
of conspiracy that did not make "economic sense. '2 8 The economics
of frictionless coordination suggest two situations where Matsushita's
"economic sense" requirement should shield firms from claims of con-
spiracy. First, if the industry structure is not conducive to coordination-
perhaps because entry is easy or because a firm could cut prices in secret
and steal business from rivals-then a court should recognize that it
would be irrational for a firm to risk prosecution by engaging in the
forbidden process without any hope of gaining market power.29 Under
such circumstances the inference of agreement from parallel pricing
would not make economic sense.30
Second, if instead entry is not easy and firms can discourage price
cutting,3 a court should consider whether it was necessary for the firms
to engage in the forbidden process to reach a coordinated, high-price
equilibrium, or whether they could achieve the same outcome through
27For an example of a court asking the latter question and finding a conspiracy in a
setting not involving electronic commerce, see United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323,
1331-35 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
28Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 596, 598 (1986);
accord, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 540 U.S. 451, 467-70 (1992).
Though neither case involved the issue of inferring an agreement on price from parallel
pricing among oligopolists, there is no reason to think that the Supreme Court intends
to consider whether some classes of conspiracy allegations make economic sense but
not others.
2See, e.g., Montana v. SuperAmerica, 559 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1983) (declining to
infer an agreement to fix price for retail gasoline in the absence of direct evidence in a
market with competitive characteristics; decision predates Matsushita). This argument will
be most persuasive in circumstantial evidence cases. If a court has reliable direct evidence
of conspiracy, it may reasonably find an agreement notwithstanding arguments that such
behavior would be irrational given market structure.
30 Baker, supra note 5, at 185 (with the Matsushita requirement, "the analytical stage has
been set for courts to conclude that in an industry with an environment not conducive
to coordination, an agreement among competitors to fix price is not plausible and should
not be inferred from circumstantial evidence.").
s Rapid identification and response to rival price cutting may discourage price reductions
by competitors. Firms that raise their own costs of lowering price, as by adopting "most-
favored-nations" clauses, can also create an industry environment inhospitable to price re-
ductions.
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leader-follower behavior that does not carry the risk of liability. In such
a case, the firms can argue that "even if we are coordinating-which, of
course, we do not admit-we did not need to agree in order to do so."
In a parallel pricing case, the firms might also contend: "We acknowledge
that we each pay attention to our rival's prices when we make our own
pricing decisions-we often follow the leader. But we make our decisions
independently, and neither negotiate with our competitors nor exchange
assurances with them about our prices." If the facts support this argu-
ment, here, too, the inference of agreement would not make eco-
nomic sense. 2
Under other circumstances, however, the inference of conspiracy
could make economic sense. In particular, a court should be willing to
infer an agreement in a parallel pricing case in an industry where entry
and discounting are discouraged if the firms appear to have been doing
more than merely following each other's market moves. Three economic
indicators could help courts infer that firms have selected a coordinated
equilibrium by engaging in the forbidden process of negotiation and
exchange of assurances.33 First, firm behavior might be more complex
than would be plausible if the outcomes had been reached absent the
forbidden process, as through mere leader-follower behavior. A focal
point or rule that developed from historic precedent or clear business
imperatives would be expected to be obvious and straightforward-such
as "we raise all our prices by a common percentage," or "we don't solicit
each other's customers or in each other's territories." More complex
relationships and rules might imply that the parties had engaged in
active negotiation to reach an agreement.34 Second, the inference of
agreement would be strengthened if the explanations offered by the
32 Baker, supra note 5, at 190-91; see also Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 49-55 (7th Cir. 1992) (no inference of conspiracy where plaintiffs
presented no direct evidence in highly concentrated market for a standardized product
with inelastic demand); cf United States v. Alex, Brown & Sons, Inc., Competitive Impact
Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,433, 40,441 (Aug. 2, 1996) (mere adherence by securities firms
to quoting convention insufficient to infer an agreement; DOJ alleged that this practice
"distilled or hardened over time" into an unlawful conspiracy).
"
3E.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906
F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991) (agreement in a parallel pricing
case could be demonstrated by evidence of direct contacts among defendants, advance
price announcements, posting of prices in unusual detail, the absence of a business
justification for advance price announcements, and the intention of the parties to use the
practices to achieve higher prices); see also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets Inc. v. Darling-
Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) (market division agreement could be
inferred from a pattern of refraining from competing on existing accounts, economic
plausibility of the defendant's incentive to collude, and some evidence of direct communi-
cations); see generally Baker, supra note 5, at 191-92.
M See Baker, supra note 5, at 162-69.
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parties about the putative legitimate business purposes are weak or even
pretextual. The most common efficiencyjustification for posting prices-
to tell prospective customers what a firm charges-is very persuasive.
For this reason mere price advertising to buyers does not raise antitrust
concerns, even if rivals also pay attention or the prices are posted in the
electronic marketplace. But other justifications may be less convincing
or less related to a legitimate purpose. Third, the inference of agreement
would be strengthened if the rivals had an opportunity to communicate,
and strengthened even more if their conduct includes overt commu-
nications spurring immediate responses even if those communications
constitute "cheap talk."
III. AIRLINES PRICE FIXING
The Antitrust Division's airlines price-fixing case highlights the anti-
competitive potential of markets with rapid information exchange. The
complaint alleged that over a multi-year period around the end of the
last decade the leading U.S. air carriers employed a computer system
run by an airline joint venture to fix prices. The computer system col-
lected each airline's actual and proposed price changes and sent them
to the various computer reservation systems used by travel agents. The
joint venture also processed the price information and gave the airlines
detailed reports that were in practice unavailable to users of computer
reservation systems. The Department of Justice alleged that the airlines
were engaged in price fixing that was facilitated by the joint venture.
The case was settled by consent agreements. 5
The airlines case shows what it takes to prove an agreement in the
electronic commerce setting. The proof did not rest primarily on direct
evidence, such as a memorialization or testimony of a participant. More
precisely, the question of whether the electronic communications consti-
tuted direct evidence of an agreement was closely related to the question
of whether the firms had reached an agreement.3 6 It was not contended
35 United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,687,
(D.D.C 1994) (final consent decree); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 1993-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,410 (D.D.C 1993) (consent decree); see also United States v.
Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3,971 (Jan. 12, 1993) (competitive impact
statement); United States' Response to Public Comments, Civ. No. 92-2854 (D.D.C. filed
Apr. 8, 1993); United States' Response to Questions in Appendix A of the Court's Order
Dated May 24, 1993, Exhibit 1, Declaration ofJonathan B. Baker, Civ. No. 92-2854 (D.D.C.
filed June 28, 1993); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 15,225
(Mar. 31, 1994) (competitive impact statement); William Gillespie, Cheap Talk, Price
Announcements, and Collusive Coordination (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper,
EAG 95-3) (Sept. 25, 1995).
36That is, the DOJ alleged that the communications involving fares could be read by
one who knew or had broken the code, as memorializing, as well as negotiating, the terms
of an agreement.
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that parallel pricing and high price levels alone would imply negotiation
and exchange of assurances. Nonetheless, the Antitrust Division alleged
that the course of conduct amounted to an illegal agreement-actually
many illegal agreements over various fares and routes-and included
elements that could and should be enjoined.
The three aspects of the evidence described above made the inference
of agreement persuasive to the government. First, there was a great deal
of communication among the airlines that they understood as such. The
airlines created their own language using fare relationships and "footnote
designators." The communications were "cheap talk," as they largely
involved information about fares that were unavailable to ticket buyers
until a consensus had been reached, or else were available only for short
periods so were not widely purchased. The airlines probably conveyed
more information through their computers than the prototypical con-
spirators meeting in a hotel room ever would. From the records of
this communication, the Antitrust Division contended it could identify
roughly fifty distinct agreements (i.e., offers, negotiations, and accep-
tances) .37
Second, the conduct was too complex to have been arrived at other
than through the forbidden process of negotiation and exchange of
assurances. One airline would post a rate change for its flights between
cities A and B and relate that to a posting involving its flights between
C and D. Other airlines would answer quickly, but echoing or revising
some feature of the first posting and perhaps bringing in routes involving
X and Y, too-none of these proposals were necessarily effective or
binding on any of them yet. These city pairs were typically unrelated in
cost or demand; rather they were connected in the communications by
use of footnote designators or other fare codes that served as signals
that the proposals were meant to be related to each other. 8 This process
continued until the carriers reached a consensus on the adjustments to
be made to the original fares. It is not hard to read these complex
outcomes-particularly as they involve city pairs not naturally related-
as resulting from a process of negotiation and agreement, albeit in a
potentially public forum.
Third, claims of legitimate business justification were unconvincing.
In practice the features of the computer-communicated price records
37The "offers" typically proposed quid pro quo conduct: "if you do X, then, and only
then, I will do Y." When the carriers had reached a consistent set of proposals through
"negotiations," all offers were "accepted" and allowed to take effect.
"
5The most attractive agreements for the carriers were probably those in which carrier
A offered to increase fares on a route into carrier B's hub in exchange for carrier B's
assent to increase fares on a route into carrier A's hub. See Baker, supra note 35.
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that conveyed offers and acceptances had little value to customers, and
sometimes were not even available either to the ticket buying public or
to travel agents, the most sophisticated non-airline users of the informa-
tion. For example, the "last ticket date" that the carriers claimed was
useful to customers trying to get the best price before it changed was
not binding on the airlines and was inaccurate about half the time.
The Antitrust Division contended that this information was used, not to
benefit ticket buyers, but to negotiate prices with other airlines. The
customer losses from higher prices potentially measured in the billions
of dollars.3 9
The consent order prevents the airlines from using "footnote designa-
tors" and other methods to engage in quasi-public negotiations about
price levels without incurring risks or costs. It does not prevent the airlines
from communicating their rate plans as long as the communications also
go to customers and as long as the communication is not just "cheap
talk." Thus, the consent order tries to strike a balance between the
interests of promoting efficient conduct and preventing coordination.
The behavior that most clearly failed to amount to legitimate communica-
tion to customers was enjoined, while the order permits behavior that
promotes efficiency.
IV. IDENTIFYING AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE
The airlines price-fixing case suggests that, as shopping increasingly
moves to the electronic marketplace, it is likely to be easier in one
39d. One recent Brookings study concludes that anticompetitive prices resulting from
price leadership cost ticket buyers $356 million per year during the 1980s. STEVEN A.
MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 77 (1995).
Although the analysis was partly motivated by the DOJ's price-fixing complaint, the study
was not designed to capture many of the harmful effects alleged and may have underesti-
mated the annual customer injury resulting from the airlines' exercise of market power.
In particular, the Brookings study identified routes in which price leadership occurred
by examining the impact of changes in each carrier's average fares during one quarter
of the year on the average fares of rival carriers during the following quarter. This approach
adapts the common econometric practice for testing "causality" to the available data, but
data limitations likely led the researchers to omit most of the routes affected by the alleged
price fixing for two reasons. First, most of the negotiations identified by the DOJ employed
fares that were unavailable to ticket buyers until consensus was reached, or else were
available only for short periods and not widely purchased. In either case, price leadership
would not be observed in the fare data regardless of the duration of the supracompetitive
prices: fare negotiations would have little or no effect on average fares, and successful
negotiations would appear as simultaneous fare increases by all carriers serving a route.
Second, most of the negotiations took place within quarters, while the study only includes
routes where a carrier's fare changes typically preceded a rival's fare changes across
quarters. Because the study mainly involved routes that would have been deemed un-
affected by price leadership, its comparison of price-cost margins between leadership and
non-leadership routes would be expected to understate the price elevation resulting from
1996]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
respect, but harder in another, to infer price fixing from parallel pricing.
The inference may become easier because the electronic marketplace
enriches the opportunities for communication. According to the Depart-
ment ofJustice, the airline carriers did not resist the temptation offered
by contemporary telecommunications technology to create a language
to engage in detailed and extensive conversations and reach complex
bargains. Given the incentive of oligopolists to make anticompetitive
communication difficult to interpret by antitrust enforcers and courts,
however, one would expect that rivals in other industries confronted
with a similar opportunity to fix prices would be cagier.
On the other hand, it will likely become more difficult to infer an
agreement from parallel prices as commerce moves to the electronic
marketplace if the information shared among rivals, and allegedly used
to negotiate price increases, is equally available and valuable to buyers.
In general, the more the information goes to customers and is used by
them, the better a defendant's claim of a legitimate business justification
and the more difficult the inference of agreement.40 It was fortunate for
antitrust enforcement that the first alleged example of price fixing in
electronic commerce occurred over a network more readily available to
rivals than customers and was conducted through communications of
little value to buyers; these features undermined the business justification
for the information exchange.41 Because public communications poten-
tially have a strong business justification (even if they also improve the
the interfirm fare coordination alleged by the DOJ. To the extent the study includes routes
affected by the alleged conspiracy, the data employed by the Brookings researchers is
imperfectly suited for isolating the effects of the alleged fare agreements because it dates
fares by travel date rather than ticket purchase date.
40This generalization will not always hold. For example, if firms negotiate a price-fixing
agreement publicly by giving advance notice of anticompetitive price increases that rivals
modify or match before a consensus is reached, then the price-fixing firms should not be
allowed to evade prosecution by claiming that buyers want the advance notice in order
to accelerate some purchases before the new, high price takes effect. Buyers would do
even better if price fixing was no longer facilitated because advance notice was prohibited.
See United States' Response to Public Comments, United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing
Co., supra note 35, at 29.
11 From one perspective it may seem remarkable that a defendant's business justification
plays any role in determining whether an agreement was reached. Firms can engage in
the forbidden process of negotiation and exchange of assurances for good or ill and their
purpose seems logically unrelated to their means. Moreover, efficiencies are already taken
into account both in determining whether an agreement that nakedly restrains trade
should be reviewed under the rule of reason and when an agreement's reasonableness is
assessed. Yet, the law has evolved this way to ensure that when a court deems conduct to
constitute an anticompetitive agreement, the court can frame an adequate remedy. The
absence of a business justification for the suspect conduct (as with other factors, like
communication and the complexity of the conduct relative to what leader-follower behavior
might reasonably yield) suggests that the firms could and would behave differently if
enjoined, and therefore that ajudicial remedy short of price regulation is indeed available.
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prospects for successful coordination among competitors), the difficult-
ies of inferring an agreement among rivals in parallel pricing cases may
become even greater with the growth of electronic commerce.
The airlines pricing-fixing case demonstrates that as commerce shifts
to the electronic marketplace and courts confront the perennial question
of whether parallel pricing by oligopolists constitutes an unlawful agree-
ment on price, the critical inquiry shifts from whether the firms met in
secret to whether their observed interactions constituted the forbidden
process, and so can be enjoined under Sherman Act Section 1. Yet,
as the business strategy field has already recognized in non-electronic
commercial settings, some anticompetitive oligopolistic behavior cannot
easily be reached under the antitrust laws. Competing sellers may some-
times be able to achieve high prices, while minimizing the risk that
antitrust enforcers and courts would infer an anticompetitive agreement
on price, by engaging in leader-follower conduct or by sharing the infor-
mation required to implement such a strategy with customers as well as
rivals. Antitrust has few good alternatives for addressing the "oligopoly
problem" beyond inferring an agreement to fix prices in violation of
Sherman Act Section 1, the approach the Department ofJustice followed
in the airlines price-fixing case.4 2 Thus, the growth of electronic com-
merce and the consequent spread of rapid information exchange to more
markets may lead to renewed concern about the "oligopoly problem" in
debates over antitrust policy.4 3
4 2 1n some cases enforcers will have direct evidence of an agreement that does not
depend upon interpreting communications in the electronic marketplace. Even if the
agreement is not memorialized, for example, a remorseful executive may testify to its
terms. Another approach is to prevent structural conditions conducive to coordination
through merger enforcement or through challenges to the "facilitating practices" by which
firms commit themselves to high prices or to rapidly detect and respond to discounting
by rivals. If facilitating practices are adopted by agreement, then the agreement may violate
Sherman Act § 1. If they are adopted unilaterally, they cannot be reached under the
Sherman Act, however, unless monopolization is threatened or achieved (thus permitting
challenge under Sherman Act § 2). Moreover, the Second Circuit, in resolving the Ethyl
litigation, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984), discouraged
the Commission from attacking unilateral facilitating practices under FTC Act § 5. For an
argument that the Second Circuit was likely wrong, and that in any event the FfC retains
the power to address such problems through informal competition rulemaking, see Baker,
supra note 5, at 207-19.
43See Baker, supra note 5, at 147.
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